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Abstract
In this chapter, we examine the labor relations through the role of trade unions, collective 
bargaining, wages and benefits across the European Union. We conclude that labor rela‐
tions have a direct influence on the labor market, designing the lines for taking decisions 
in organizations, but also, by governments. Our argumentation explains the relationship 
between employers and employees through legal rights (established by the law), negotia‐
tion process, collective bargaining, ‘actors’ in this process, wage and benefits, social and 
security protection.
Keywords: negotiation, collective bargaining, trade unions, wages and benefits, social 
protection, European countries
1. Introduction
Today’s workers want more than a salary, and they want additional benefits to enrich their 
lives, to increase their importance at workplace and to be valuable for the organization. The 
labor relations are more than a static interpretation of contract between an employee and an 
employer. Means a sum of connections between skills, abilities, values and opportunities at 
work. Employee role in organization has grown in importance and variety over the time. For 
them, the labor relations become a way to live, to self‐development and to obtain recognition. 
The employers realize that to keep motivated and committed people in organization need 
more than a salary. It is about benefits in financial terms, but, also, talking about safety at 
work, security, rights and duties. Benefits are necessary to assure the job satisfaction.
Labor relations are the term used to define the process between employers and employees, 
management and unions in order to make decisions in organizations. The decisions taken 
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refer to wages, working conditions, hours of work, and safety at work, security and griev‐
ances. Why is an important topic for Human Resource Management?
It is know that wage and other economic benefits for employees represent not only their current 
income, but also the potential for economic growth and the ability to live comfortable during 
the active life and after the retirement. Wage is considered as an important economic variable 
for competitiveness. The world economic crises have shown that the role of wages in sustaining 
demand in a context of stagnant growth and very low inflation is very important and needs a 
particular attention from the part of management boards, government and employees, through 
their representants.
Wages and benefits received by employees for their work represent the compensation or ‘the 
price paid by employers for their workers services’. This requires a specific analyze due to 
the fact that the work is realized under a contract and propose and active commitment of the 
workers [1]. From this perspective, the wage issues require a specific analytical framework 
because the work cannot be separated by the human beings, and according to the several 
studies, the level of payment and economic benefits of employees are positively related to 
employee satisfaction at work.
Wage and salary are considered as most important and difficult collective bargaining issue. 
In the employment relationships, the collective bargaining process has several implication at 
individual levels, for the employers, as a determinant of production and labor costs, among 
employers on the competition market, between employers and employees as a distribution of 
added value, for employees, as a key factor for their income and sustainability on a dynamic 
labor market, among employees, expressing the solidarity through the ‘wage floors’ applying 
to different group of workers at a given bargaining level.
The parties could negotiate the total package of wage and benefits in individual terms or in 
collective terms, but reflecting the aim of labor contract: The employees must be paid for their 
work, and the employers must receive qualitative work.
Also, the negotiations reflect the interest of all the parties involved: managers, employees 
through their representants and government.
In this chapter, we examine the labor relations through the role of trade unions, collective bar‐
gaining, wages and benefits across the European Union. We conclude that labor relations have 
a direct influence on the labor market, designing the lines for taking decisions in organizations, 
but also, by governments. Our argumentation explains the relationship between employers 
and employees through legal rights (established by the law), negotiation process, collective 
bargaining, ‘actors’ in this process, wage and benefits, social and security protection.
For the policy‐makers to find a balance between assuring the rights and promote competitive‐
ness in their organization, also to make their employers more productive is a key priority, draw‐
ing on a range of policy measure. Important aspects cover wage settings, collective bargaining, 
employees’ representativeness, safety and security needs, working hours and contracts. All 
these influence the policies and the labor market flexibility. The employees find satisfaction in 
being able to perform task adequately and are more willing to perform a better job, increasing 
the involvement at workplace and become more implies [2–5].
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2. Data and methodology
The necessary data to conduct our research were collected from various statistics, official 
reports, databases of the worker‐participation.eu and ICTWSS: Database on Institutional 
Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts. The ana‐
lyzed countries are EU‐28, grouped in five analytical clusters, defined by European 
Commission as industrial regimes [5], namely: (a) North Europe: Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden; (b) Central‐West Europe: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands and Slovenia; (c) South Europe: France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain; 
(d) West Europe: Cyprus, Ireland, Malta and the United Kingdom; (e) Central‐Eastern 
Europe: Bulgaria; Czech Republic; Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania; Hungary; Poland; Romania 
and Slovakia.
The main indicators taken into account are collective bargaining coverage, trade union density, 
collective bargaining coordination index and collective bargaining centralization. The chosen 
period was 2013–2014 for the analyzed countries, except for Portugal were no data were avail‐
able for collective bargaining centralization. Also, for Cyprus, we used the data available only 
for the south part of the county.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for included variables, the number of analyzed 
countries, the minimum and maximum values for the chosen indicators, the mean and stan‐
dard deviation.
For the sample of 28 EU countries, we studied the bivariate correlations between the variables, 
using Pearson correlation coefficient and the associated p values. A value lower than 0.05 
dictates the significance of the used variables, while the correlation coefficient values are a 
number from −1 to 1, which determines whether the sets of data are related. The closer to 1 
the more confident we are of a positive linear correlation and closer to −1 the more confident 
we are of a negative linear correlation. The person correlation values closer to zero indicate 
the lack of any relationship between the variables.
Descriptive Statistics
N Minimum Maximum Mean std. deviation
Collective bargaining 
coverage
28 12.50 98.00 59.3036 26.85535
Trade union density 28 8.00 74.00 30.8214 19.33344
Collective bargaining 
centralization
27 1.00 4.60 2.0552 1.00857
Collective bargaining 
coordination index
28 1.00 5.00 2.5357 1.29048
Valid N (listwise) 27
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
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For collective bargaining coverage and trade union density, we calculated the mean for 
the chosen period based on the data provided by worker‐participation.eu, while, for col‐
lective bargaining coordination index, we used the estimated index values based on a five‐
point scale [6]. Collective Bargaining Centralization is an indicator calculated by Visser as: 
Level—(Frequency or scope of additional enterprise bargaining (FAEB =  ¯  0,3) + Articulation of 
enterprise bargaining (AEB =  ¯  0,3))/4(=max value) + (AEB + Derogation (DER =  ¯  0,3)‐1)/5( = max 
value), and the index scores are between 0 and 3, in which ‘0’ represents the lower value and 
‘3’ the higher value [6].
3. Wage systems and institutions: unions and management wage concerns
The wage systems and institutions that served the issue are deepening linked by the market, 
legislation and industrial relations. The market is the factor, which reflects the macro‐ and 
microequilibrium between the labor force and state, the differences in labor and cost produc‐
tivity. The legislation has the reglementation role for work and the conditions to made it and 
put into provisions the relationships between employers, employees and government. Setting 
the minimum wage is a requirement for a special category of workers, and an objective for the 
policy of governments.
The total economic package should be negotiated between employers and employees by their 
representants to estimate accurately the total cost of the contract of work, in term of salary and 
benefits. The collective bargaining has different dimensions and indicates, in a general way, 
how the conditions and requirements of the work interact with legal and market regulation. 
Even if the collective bargaining is independently and autonomous than the legislation, the 
results of the negotiations should be in accordance with the legal provisions.
The collective bargaining process is the actual negotiations carried out by the parties to reach 
an agreement. Artful use of this process can improve the relationship between an employer 
and employees and has as result a contract for both parties [7, 8].
The bargaining process implies the representative of employees, the management representa‐
tives. Successful negotiations depend on the knowledge and skills of the negotiators, which 
should prepare their side’s interests in the bargaining issues. They should make realist pro‐
posals and within the framework of negotiations. The bargaining items could be: mandatory, 
as rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, overtime pay, holidays, pensions, insurance 
benefits, employee security, job performance, management‐union relationship, subcontract‐
ing or relocating union members’ work, medical exams and permissive, as indemnity bounds, 
preferential hiring, pension benefits off retired employees, use of union label, employer child 
care, plant closings.
Concerning these issues, many changes have been noticed in industrial relations over the last 
decade due to long‐term development trends caused by an ever‐changing socio‐economic 
environment. The trends shifts occur especially since the beginning of the recent economic 
and financial crisis and their impact varied across European Union Member states.
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In the table, we group the EU member states in five analytical clusters, defined by the European 
Commission as industrial relations regimes or arrangements: (a) North Europe: Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden; (b) Central‐West Europe: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Slovenia; (c) South Europe: France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain; (d) West 
Europe: Cyprus, Ireland, Malta and the United Kingdom; (e) Central‐Eastern Europe: Bulgaria; 
Czech Republic; Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania; Hungary; Poland; Romania and Slovakia. These 
countries are grouped in relation to some collective features related to union density, bargain‐
ing coverage rates, employee representativeness and role of the state and social partners in the 
industrial relations [5].
Trade Union trends have not been stable across the EU member states, and many differences are 
noticed both in the change of employers’ density and the level of unionization. In the literature 
are underlined different types of trade unions, starting from those highly concentrated and rein‐
forced, (just one confederation in Ireland) to those intensive fragmented (12 confederations in 
Italy) [9]. However, if the trade unions are grouped under a large confederation (see, for instance, 
German Confederation of Trade Unions), the absolute number can deceive us in establishing 
the actual level of system fragmentation. Within the Nordic countries, the higher proportion of 
employees in Unions is registered in Finland (74%), followed by Sweden (70%), Denmark (67%) 
and Norway (52%). In the Central‐West Europe, trade unions tend to group up in one (Austria: 
ÖGB), two (Luxemburg: OGB‐L and LCCB; the Netherlands: FNV and CNV) or several union con‐
federations (Slovenia: seven confederations with ZSSS dominant). Since the fall of manufactur‐
ing employment, Eastern German unification, ideological competitiveness and socio‐economic 
factors, this region predominant trend of employers unions’ density has gradually fallen in the 
recent years. In Southern Europe, the trade unions are formed and grouped together in accor‐
dance with political beliefs and religious views. The lowest regional and EU‐28 level are reg‐
istered in France (8%), country that actually benefits by strong union support in elections for 
employee representatives and poses the capability to mobilize a large number of workers. The 
other southern European countries proportions are situated between 19 and 35% of unionized 
employees from total workers, with the higher percentage recorded by Italy where the number 
of trade unions is the largest of any countries in the EU. In the western countries, like the United 
Kingdom and Ireland, trade unions grouped in one or two confederation coexist with individual 
independent unions that are enforced with considerable power and influence. With around half 
of all employees belonging to unions, Cyprus1 and Malta occupy the first two positions from 
the Western European Countries. Those are characterized by the existence of two large unions’ 
confederations in each country (PEO and SEK for Cyprus and GWV and UHM for Malta), with a 
large spectrum of workers, although in Malta teachers, bank employees and nurses are grouped 
in independent unions. The Central‐Eastern Europe union density has fallen since the transition 
to a new economic and political system in the 1990s. Nowadays, the Central‐Eastern system is 
characterized by the existence of one up to six union confederations and, in some cases (Slovakia 
for instance), by individual unions marked with significant autonomy and impact.
The relative change in employees and trade unions trends is a consequence of the recent 
economic and financial crises impact. These recent developments can be explained through 
1The data is available only for the south part of the island, officially recognized by the state government.
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factors like low level of employment of young people, part‐time hiring, together with the 
higher number of fixed‐term contracts which dropped the number of unionized employees 
since 2008 in many European countries. Recent developments appear to have slowed, at least 
for the moment, the downfall of the trade union density.
In European industrial relations or arrangements, collective bargaining represents a funda‐
mental element through which employers and their organizations, on one side, and trade 
unions, on the other, can typically determine wages and working conditions, and relations 
between involved parties. Collective bargaining coverage represents ‘an indicator of the 
extent to which the terms of workers’ employment are influenced by collective negotiation. It 
is calculated as the number of employees covered by the collective agreement divided by the 
total number of wage and salary‐earners’ [10]. The contrast between the European Member 
states is particularly strong with regard to collective bargaining coverage. In North, Central‐
West and South Europe, the coverage rate is above 60%, with the exception of Luxemburg. 
Between West Europe and Central‐Eastern Europe, only Malta has a coverage rate above 60%. 
The lower collective bargaining coverage is registered in Poland (10–15%) and the United 
Kingdom (29%). In the literature, coverage rates are correlated with the employers’ density 
rates, and in several countries like Germany and the Netherlands, the two concepts are con‐
nected and associated one with other. As Carley [11] noted ‘in these countries, employers 
who are member of employers’ organization are generally bound by collective agreements. In 
other cases, coverage rates go beyond employers’ density rates due to statutory extension pro‐
cedures that are supported and legislated by governments. This is the case in France, where 
statutory extension compensates for low trade union membership levels [11].
Table 2 also shows that the level at which collective barraging takes place also differs across 
EU member states. For instance, while for North, Central‐West and South Europe groups, 
the sector is the main place where negotiations between the involved parts occur, in the West 
(with the exception of Cyprus) and Central‐East Europe, different standards are applied and 
the bargaining processes between employees and trade unions are at company level. Although 
this is the overall trend in the analyzed groups, some of the EU countries have a mixed level 
approach (Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Slovakia), and collective bargaining takes place at 
both industry and company level or other different styles are adopted (in Belgium, negotia‐
tions take place at the national level, while in France and Spain, we have three levels proce‐
dure: national, industry and company/organization).
In the majority of the European member states, the employee representation at the workplace 
is through unions, except the Central‐West area where the workplace structures are repre‐
sented by works councils (with the exception of Slovenia dominated by union structure, and 
Belgium and France with both unions and works council).
North Europe, Central‐West and South Europe have employee representation at board level, 
with the exception of Belgium (not featured at board level, apart from a handful of publicly 
owned organizations) and Italy (no right for employee representation at board level although 
a proposal have been included in the Jobs Acts 2002 legislation). In the West Europe, just Ireland 
accepts employee representation but only in the state‐owned sector. In the Central‐Eastern 
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Regime dimension North Europe Central‐West 
Europe
South Europe West Europe Central‐Eastern 
Europe
Trade union density 65.75 30.66 21.20 40.75 16.33
Collective 
bargaining 
coverage
82.25 79 81 46.5 29.61 (*)
Main level 
of collective 
bargaining
Sector Sector (Belgium: 
national; 
Luxemburg and 
the Netherlands: 
companies)
Sector (France: 
sector and 
companies; 
Spain (new law 
gives precedence 
to company 
agreements)
Company 
(except Cyprus)
Company 
(Romania and 
Slovakia: sector 
and company)
Leading employee 
representation
Union based 
(Norway: 
“works council” 
exist in some 
companies 
but their role 
is to improve 
competitiveness)
Works council 
based (*except 
Slovenia—union 
dominates and 
Belgium: both 
unions and 
works councils)
Union based 
(France: union 
and works 
council; Greece 
and Portugal: 
works council 
exists just in 
theory; Spain: 
works councils—
although they are 
dominated by 
unions)
Union based 
(Ireland and the 
UK does not 
exclude other 
structures)
Union based 
(**) (Poland 
and Slovakia: 
union and works 
councils)
Employee 
representation at 
board level
Yes: (state‐
owned and 
private 
companies)
Yes (state‐owned 
and private 
companies 
(except Belgium)
Yes (state‐owned 
companies 
(except Italy)
No (except 
Ireland: 
state‐owned 
companies)
Irregular (***)
Role of social 
partners in policy 
making
Institutionalized Institutionalized Irregular; 
politicized
Rare/specific 
event‐driven
Irregular; 
politicized; social 
partners weak
Role of the state in 
industrial relations
Limited Limited; strong 
legalism
State active; 
clientelistic 
relations
State 
strong; rare 
interventions
State dominant; 
strong legalism
Countries Denmark, 
Finland, 
Norway, 
Sweden
Belgium, 
Germany, 
(Ireland), 
Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, 
Austria, Slovenia, 
(Finland)
Greece, Spain, 
France, Italy, 
(Hungary), 
Portugal
Ireland, Malta, 
Cyprus, the UK
Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, 
Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia
(*) In calculating collective bargaining coverage for Poland, we took the average mean, based on the date provided 
by http://www.worker‐participation.eu/National‐Industrial‐Relations/Countries/Sweden/Trade‐Unions. Available from 
Refs. [12, 13].
(**) Overall other representatives are not excluded.
(***) No category: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania and yes: state‐owned companies for the rest.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Table 2. Industrial regimes across Europe.
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Group, the extent of employee representation at board level is divided between the countries: 
While in Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia employee representation do exist, 
in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania, there is no participation at board level, 
although is some situations employee representatives can have a consultative role in share‐
holders’ meetings.
Moreover, the role played by social partners in public policy‐making is different across the five 
analyzed groups. In the North and Central‐West Europe corporatist clusters, the implication 
of employers’ organization and unions in designing policy proposals is extensive, and their 
connection with political actors is highly institutionalized. In Western countries, although 
social policy‐makers are constantly engaged in social and economic debates, not always their 
beliefs are reflected in policy outcomes. Distinct practices occur in the other groups involved 
in the analyses. For instance, in South Europe, the role of social partners in policy‐making 
depends mostly on the individual governments’ willingness of inclusion. Despite the fact that 
the engaged policy‐makers are formally involved in the decision‐making policy, the govern‐
ment has the freedom to oppose their participation. In the Central and Eastern Europe, an 
effective social partnership can be undermined by organization politicization which ‘com‐
bined with the overall weakness of organized interest representation, social partners’ politici‐
zation seriously limits their influence in the policy‐making sphere’ [14].
The role of the state and its involvement in collective bargaining differs significantly across 
EU countries. In North, Central‐West and West Europe, state interventions are limited and in 
the latter region quite rare. In Southern European countries, although there exist strong pres‐
sures toward less state regulation regarding collective bargaining and working conditions, 
the state assumes an almost exclusive role in governing change, particularly in the recent 
economic context. Regulatory amendments framework, alongside clientelistic relations with 
social partners, has mainly limited the governing capacity of trade unions and employer 
organizations over industrial relations. In Central‐Eastern Europe, the collective bargaining 
is dominated by the government; meanwhile, the existing legislation remains the only instru‐
ment in settling work relations disputes.
In Table 3, the correlations between different institutions of wage bargaining are described. 
Pearson correlation coefficients demonstrate the positive relationships among all the variables 
and strong association between: collective bargaining coverage with coordination (0.746) and 
centralization (0.774), among trade union density with collective bargaining coordination 
(0.595), and the both way and powerful relationship between coordination index and central‐
ization. Strong actors are interrelated with centralized and coordinated institutions and high 
rates for bargaining coverage; meanwhile, fragile and weak players are connected with low 
levels of coordination and de‐centralization.
Except Collective Bargaining Coverage and Trade Unions Density mentioned already in the 
analyses, two more indicators appear in Table 3: Collective Bargaining Coordination Index 
(CBCI) and Collective Bargaining Centralization.
Collective bargaining coordination represents the combination between the level of bargain‐
ing and the range of sectors/organization that are bound by the collective agreement that 
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succeeds negotiations. Collective bargaining coordination index (CBCI) was first developed by 
Kenworthy [15] and put in application with some small adjustments by authors like Visser 
which estimates the indexed values based on a five‐point scale [6]:
• If maximum or minimum wage rates/increases based on: enforceable agreements between 
the peak association(s) of unions and employers affecting the whole economy or entire 
private sector with or without government involvement, and/or government imposition of 
wage schedule/freeze, with peace obligation, then a score of ‘5’ is set.
• A ‘4’ score is set if wage norms or guidelines (recommendations) are based on central‐
ized bargaining by peak associations with or without government involvement, informal 
centralization of industry‐level bargaining by a powerful and monopolistic union con‐
federation and extensive, regularized pattern setting coupled with high degree of union 
concentration centralized bargaining by peak association(s), with or without govern‐
ment involvement, and/or government imposition of wage schedule/freeze, with peace 
obligation.
Institutional correlations
Collective 
bargaining 
coverage
Trade union 
density
Collective 
bargaining 
coordination index 
(CBCI)
Collective 
bargaining 
centralization
Collective 
bargaining 
coverage
Pearson 
correlation
1 .450** .746** .774**
Sig. (1‐tailed) .008 .000 .000
N 28 28 28 27
Trade union 
density
Pearson 
correlation
.450** 1 .595** .402*
Sig. (1‐tailed) .008 .000 .019
N 28 28 28 27
Collective 
bargaining 
coordination 
index (CBCI)
Pearson 
correlation
.746** .595** 1 .879**
Sig. (1‐tailed) .000 .000 .000
N 28 28 28 27
Collective 
bargaining 
centralization
Pearson 
correlation
.774** .402* .879** 1
Sig. (1‐tailed) .000 .019 .000
N 27 27 27 27
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (one‐tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (one‐tailed).
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Table 3. Institutional features/linkages of wage bargaining.
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• ‘3’ score is set if negotiation guidelines are based on limited government involvement on 
central bargaining by major associations, informal centralization of bargaining at industry 
level and on government arbitration or intervention.
• If we have a mixed sector and firm level bargaining with weak enforceability of industry 
agreements than a ‘2’ score is considered.
• ‘1’ for none of the above: fragmented wage bargaining, confined largely to individual firms 
or plants.
From Figure 1, we can observe that 7.1% of the analyzed countries (Finland, Belgium) score a 
‘5’ value, meaning that economy‐wide bargaining is based either on enforceable agreements 
or on government establishment of a wage schedule, freeze or ceiling. The larger percent 
(32.1%) is registered by those countries (Luxemburg, France, Greece, Malta, Cyprus, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Portugal and Romania), which have a mixed sector and firm level bargaining 
characterized by weak enforceability of industry agreements. In some cases (14.3%—Slovenia, 
Italy, Spain and Slovakia), the industry bargaining is characterized by an irregular pattern set‐
ting and narrow implication of central organization and limited freedoms for firms bargain‐
ing. A 21.4% of the analyzed countries register a ‘4’ value score, while 25% of them register 
fragmented wage bargaining, confined largely to individual firms or plants (Ireland, the UK, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Poland).
Another used indicator, Collective Bargaining Centralization or the actual level of wage bargain‐
ing is calculated by Visser [6] as: Level—(Frequency or scope of additional enterprise bargain‐
ing (FAEB =  ¯  0,3) + Articulation of enterprise bargaining (AEB =  ¯  0,3))/4( = max value) + (AEB + 
Derogation (DER =  ¯  0,3)−1)/5( = max value) in which:
• Frequency or scope of additional enterprise bargaining (FAEB) scores is between 0 and 3, in 
which ‘0’ represents the value for no additional enterprise, ‘1’ for rarity and, respectively, 
the frequency of additional enterprise bargaining in large firms and ‘3’ for its regularity.
• Articulation of enterprise bargaining (AEB) equals with values from  ¯  0,3, where ‘0’ score 
means that this concept does not apply; ‘1’ score is applied for disarticulated enterprise bar‐
gaining or if exits is reinforced by non‐union bodies; ‘2’ denotes that articulated bargaining 
is established under union control; and ‘3’ score is applied for disarticulated bargaining 
abolish or limited by sectoral agreements or existing law.
• Derogation is also valued from  ¯  0,3 where, ‘0’ value stands for inversed favorability; ‘1’ for 
the linkage between agreements not subject to existing law; ‘2’ agreements are law en‐
forced but under some conditions derogation is possible; ‘3’ favorability is anchored in law 
and strictly applied, no derogation [6].
In the North Europe, the higher is the collective bargaining coverage, the higher are the rates 
for coordination and centralization. From Central‐West Europe, Belgium has the higher value 
not only for coverage and density but also for collective bargaining coordination and central‐
ization. The lowest values regarding collective bargaining coordination index (CBCI) and col‐
lective bargaining centralization are registered in most Central‐Eastern European countries 
(Figures 1 and 2).
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Figure 1. Collective bargaining coordination index (CBCI), EU‐28. Source: Authors’ calculation.
Figure 2. Collective bargaining centralization, EU‐28. Source: Authors’ calculation. *** No data are available for Portugal 
on Collective Bargaining Centralization.
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Regardless the importance of coverage and trade union density, the above described indica‐
tors, collective bargaining coordination index (CBCI) and collective bargaining centralization 
represent important assets in association of wage setting with economic and labor market 
performance measures. For instance, in the literature has been identified that as the extend of 
union coverage increases from less than one quarter to more than 70%, unemployment more 
than doubles, but bargaining coordination growth tend to compensate this effect [16].
The benefits systems are very important for the employees and employers, also. For the 
employee, the benefits represent that the income needs for necessities of life and is part of the 
economic package that can receive. For the employers, is a manner to motivate the people, to 
attract and to sustain their personal development in organizations, to retain the personal and 
to increase the productivity and competitively on the market.
Another important topic for the labor relations is job security. Today, the security at work 
became such important as wages and economic incomes and implies rights to work, to be 
promoted, to perform at work, to be fire or lay‐off.
According to industrial relations research, payment level is positively related to employee 
satisfaction [17–20], employees considering as a primary indicator of the organization good‐
will. The unions’ objectives concerning the level of wages are direct related to negotiation. The 
unions’ goals in wage bargaining are to achieve a maximum level of wages and benefits for its 
members and to maintain the jobs as long as possible. Also, the bargaining process follows to 
assure a structure of wage scales between employees, negotiating for differences in working 
conditions, skills, seniority, age and job classification.
The establishment of a statutory or collectively agreed minimum wages is an important 
way of policy intervention in wage setting processes. Most of the European member states 
have different forms of regulations in determine minimum wages enforcement: statutory 
minimum wages and minimum wages established through collective agreements. In the 
first type, the minimum wage levels are fixed either by government legislation or through 
inter‐sectoral agreements at national level. In the second situation, the wages are established 
by consultation with social partners or tripartite agreements. Although these are the main 
minimal wages set approaches, different combinations of these forms of regulations are not 
excluded.
Visser sets a nine‐item scale to measure the minimum wage setting according to the fol‐
lowing statements [6]: ‘0’ value score is set for non‐statutory minimum wage; ‘1’ represents 
the case scenario in which the minimal wages are set in consultation with social partners 
(sectoral collective agreements) or tripartite agreements; ‘2’ values are associated with the 
hypostasis that minimum wages are set by national agreements, along unions and employ‐
ers; ‘3’ the minimum wage is established based on an extended agreement enforced by law 
or Ministerial decree; ‘4’ through tripartite negotiations, the minimal wages is decided; ‘5’ 
the government sets the national minimal wages, after voluntary tripartite consultations; ‘6’ 
minimum wage is adjust by judges or experts; ‘7’ the minimum wage is fixed by the state 
but in accordance with a indexed‐based minim wage; ‘8’ government established minimum 
wage without fixed rule.
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In Figure 3, we can observe that in the European Member states, there are some forms of 
establishing the minimum wage settings. In 46.1% of the analyzed countries, the minim wage 
is set by government and is based either on fixed rule (26.9%) or is bound by index‐based 
minimum wage (19.2%). In 19.3% of the cases, the minim wages are set by sectoral collective 
agreements or tripartite wage boards. Only in 11.5% of the countries, the minimum wage is 
set by national agreements between unions and employers, and in 7.7% of the cases is estab‐
lished based on an extended agreement enforced by law or Ministerial decree. A very small 
percentage of 3.8% remains for those European countries in which the government sets the 
national minimal wages, after voluntary tripartite consultations.
Human Resource Management is concerned with the development of both individuals and 
the organization in which they operate. Wage issues, economic benefits, job security and 
seniority, grievances and possibilities to resolve them are themes with a high impact at the 
level of organizations in terms of retaining good people, motivating and promoting, hiring 
and lay‐off. It is a complex world of relations in which people are involved. In this regard, the 
decisions take reflects the capability of management to respond to the complex requirements 
and to solve problems.
The chapter reflects the current issues and investigations in this complex and important field 
of research.
Figure 3. Minimum wage setting in EU 28. Source: Authors’ representation. ***No data are available for Romania on 
minimum wage setting in 2014.
Labor Relations: Contemporary Issues in Human Resource Management
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.68625
165
Author details
Ana‐Maria Bercu1* and Ana Iolanda Vodă2
*Address all correspondence to: bercu@uaic.ro
1 Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, 
Romania
2 Department of Interdisciplinary Research—Humanities and Social Sciences, Alexandru 
Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, Romania
References
[1] Akerlof GA. Labor contracts as partial gift exchange. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
1982;97(4):543–569. DOI: 10.2307/1885099
[2] Appelbaum E, Bailey T, Berg P, Kalleberg AL. Manufacturing Advantage: Why High 
Performance Work Systems Pay Off. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press; 2000. 
ISBN 978‐0‐8014‐8655‐5
[3] Millette V, Gagné M. Designing volunteers’ tasks to maximize motivation, satisfaction 
and performance: The impact of job characteristics on volunteer engagement. Motivation 
and Emotion. 2008;32(1):11–22. DOI: 10.1007/s11031‐007‐9079‐4
[4] Hepworth DH, Rooney RH, Rooney GD, Strom‐Gottfried K. Empowerment Series: 
Direct Social Work Practice: Theory and Skills. Canada: Nelson Education; 2016. ISBN 
978‐0840028648
[5] European Commission. Directorate‐General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities Unit F.1 Industrial Relations in Europe 2008. Industrial Relations & 
Industrial Change; 2009. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities ISBN: 978‐92‐79‐10105‐2. DOI: 10.2767/54876
[6] Visser J. ICTWSS Database. version 5.0. Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute for Advanced 
Labour Studies AIAS; 2015. Open access database at: www.uva‐aias.net/nl/data/ictwss
[7] Carrel MR, Heavrin C. Labor Relations and Collective Bargaining: Private and Public 
Sectors. 10th ed. Pearson Education, Inc., New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall; 2003. p. 218
[8] Jackson MP, Leopold JW, Tuck K, Shams SR. Decentralization of Collective Bargaining: 
An Analysis of Recent Experience in the UK. New York: Palgrave Macmillian; 1993. DOI: 
10.1007/978‐1‐349‐22799‐0
[9] Pedersini R, Welz C. Representativeness of the social partners in the European cross‐indus‐
try social dialogue. Eurofound: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions, Dublin; 2014. Available from: http://www.worker‐participation.eu/
EU‐Social‐Dialogue/Latest‐developments/Representativeness‐of‐social‐partners‐in‐the‐
European‐cross‐industry‐social‐dialogue [Accessed on 07 February, 2017]
Issues of Human Resource Management166
[10] OECD Employment Outlook. Chapter 5: Collective Bargaining: Levels and Coverage, 
OECD, 1994. p. 171. Available from: https://www.oecd.org/els/emp/2409993.pdf [Accessed 
on 07 February].
[11] Carley M. Industrial relations in the EU Member States and candidate countries. 
European Industrial Relations Observatory; 2002. Available from: http://www.euro‐
found.europa. eu/eiro/2002/07/feature/tn0207104f.htm. [Accessed on 07 February, 2017]
[12] Fulton L. Worker representation in Europe. Labour Research Department and ETUI. 
Produced with the assistance of the SEEurope Network; 2015. Available from: http://
www.worker‐participation.eu/National‐Industrial‐Relations. [Accessed on 07 February, 
2017]
[13] Fulton L. Worker representation in Europe. Labour Research Department and ETUI. 
Produced with the assistance of the SEEurope Network; 2013. Available from: http://
www.worker‐participation.eu/National‐Industrial‐Relations. [Accessed on 07 February, 
2017]
[14] Jagodziński R. Benchmarking Working Europe 2012; 2012. ISBN 978‐2‐87452‐262‐8. 
Available from https://works.bepress.com/romuald_jagodzinski/22/ [Accessed on 15 
January, 2017]
[15] Kenworthy L. Wage‐setting measures: A survey and assessment. World Politics. 2011; 
54(1):57–98.
[16] Nickell S, Layard R. Labor market institutions and economic performance. In: Ashenfelter 
O, Card D, editors. Handbook of Labor Economics. Vol. 3. North‐Holland, Amsterdam: 
Elsevier, 1999. pp. 3029–3084. DOI: 10.1016/S1573‐4463(99)30037‐7
[17] Berger C, Schwab D. Pay incentives and pay satisfaction. Industrial Relations. 1980; 
19(2):206. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468‐232X.1980.tb01090.x
[18] Bettencourt LA, Brown SW. Contact employees: Relationships among workplace fairness, 
job satisfaction and prosocial service behaviors. Journal of Retailing. 1997;73(1):39–61. 
DOI: 10.1016/S0022‐4359(97)90014‐2
[19] Judge TA, Piccolo RF, Podsakoff NP, Shaw JC, Rich BL. The relationship between pay 
and job satisfaction: A meta‐analysis of the literature. Journal of Vocational Behavior. 
2010;77(2):157–167. DOI: 10.1016/j.jvb.2010.04.002
[20] Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development. Pensions at a Glance 2013: 
Retirement‐Income Systems in OECD and G20 Countries. 2013. Available from: http://
www.oecd.org/pensions/publicpensions/OECDPensionsAtAGlance2013.pdf
Labor Relations: Contemporary Issues in Human Resource Management
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.68625
167

